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A DEATH SENTENCE FOR JUSTICE: THE FEENEY AMENDMENT
FRUSTRATES FEDERAL SENTENCING
I.

INTRODUCTION

Sentencing might be a judge's most important role in which the use
of discretion is both warranted and necessary. While only judges are
uniquely qualified on the subject of sentencing, recent legislation suggests
that Congress feels judges are incapable ofjudging. 1 The Feeney Amendment of the Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of
Children Today Act ("PROTECT Act") 2 will eviscerate a very crucial part
of the sentencing process-downward departures. 3 By limiting a judge's
discretion or willingness to order sentences below those provided by the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines"), defendants are no longer
treated on a case-by-case basis, but rather are given a "one size fits all"
approach to justice. 4 This draconian approach to sentencing will likely
have an adverse impact throughout the system by frustrating its functioning actors-not only the judges, but also defense attorneys, prosecutors
1. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 404 (1989) (qualifying judiciary
as proper entity to sentence). U.S. Supreme CourtJustice Kennedy commented
that the "trial judge is the only actor in the system most experienced with exercising discretion in a transparent, opened, and reasoned way." Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy, Address at the American Bar Association Annual Meeting 5 (Aug. 9,
2003) [hereinafter Kennedy Address] (addressing inadequacies and injustices of
prison system). Justice Kennedy then requested, "Please do not use our courts but
then say the judge is incapable of judging." Id. (urging Congress to reconsider
new legislation that nearly strips judges of discretion at sentencing).
2. See Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children
Today Act (PROTECT Act), Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401, 117 Stat. 650, 667-76 (2003)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553, 3742 (2003); 28 U.S.C. §§ 994, 991
(2003)) (containing controversial "Feeney Amendment" or "Feeney"). The
phrases "PROTECT Act" and "Feeney Amendment" are often used interchangeably to refer to this controversial legislation. For a discussion of the origin of the
Feeney Amendment, see infra notes 34-46 and accompanying text.
3. See Letter from Frank 0. Bowman III et al. to Senators Orrin G. Hatch and
Patrick Leahy, Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate 1 (Apr. 2, 2003) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Letter from Bowman] (expressing law professors' concern with Feeney Amendment).
4. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553, 3742 (providing circumstances limiting or proscribingjudicial discretion); 28 U.S.C. §§ 994, 991 (same); see also Mark H. Allenbaugh,
Who's Afraid of the FederalJudiciary? Why Congress'FearofJudicialSentencing Discretion
May Undermine a Generation of Reform, 27 CH-AMPION 6, 9 (2003) (citing Letter from
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL) to Congressional Representatives (Apr. 9, 2003)).
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and the U.S. Sentencing Commission ("Commission").5 The result of this
collective frustration could lead to the ultimate demise of the system.
This Comment discusses the practice of federal sentencing, the impact the Feeney Amendment will have on ajudge's ability to use discretion
and the effect on other actors in the sentencing process. Part II summarizes the contemporary federal sentencing system. 6 Part III addresses the
enactment of recent legislation adverse to the sentencing system. 7 Part IV
details the Feeney Amendment's effect on judicial discretion in sentencing.8 Part V focuses on the impact the new sentencing rules will have on
different actors in the criminal justice system. 9 Part VI discusses the positive impact of the PROTECT Act on child protection law.' 0 Finally, Part
VII highlights and encourages efforts to repeal the controversial legislation so the Guidelines can, if needed, be redrafted in a reasoned and informed way.'1 While the Guidelines may not be perfect, taking away a
judge's ability to consider the particular circumstances of a defendant and
the crime is not the answer. 12 The Feeney Amendment is potentially a life
sentence for judicial discretion and a death sentence for justice.

5. See, e.g., Jonathon Groner, FederalJudiciary Opposes Sentencing Change, LEGAL
TIMES, Aug. 25, 2003, at 8 (discussing frustration with limitingjudicial discretion of
federal judiciary). At a hearing of the U.S. Sentencing Commission on August 19,
2003, "the federal judiciary formally voiced its opposition to a directive from Congress that the panel reduce the number of 'downward departures' in criminal sentencing." Id. (noting opposition); see also Letter from Jon M. Sands, Chair, Federal
Defenders' Sentencing Guidelines Subcommittee, to The Honorable Diana E.
Murphy, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Commission (Apr. 25, 2003) (on file with author)
[hereinafter Letter from Sands] (detailing frustration by defense attorneys because "li]n [their] experience, downward departures are working as intended by
Congress-preserving some fairness and individualized sentencing within the guidelines system").
6. For a discussion of the development of federal sentencing, see infra notes
13-33 and accompanying text.
7. For a discussion of the enactment of the PROTECT Act, see infra notes 3446 and accompanying text.
8. For a discussion of the Feeney Amendment's effects on a judge's role in
sentencing, see infra notes 47-86 and accompanying text.
9. For a discussion of the Feeney Amendment's influence on defense attorneys, prosecutors and the U.S. Sentencing Commission, see infra notes 87-135 and
accompanying text.
10. For a discussion of the effect of the Amendment on child protection laws,
see infra notes 136-55 and accompanying text.
11. For an overview of efforts to repeal the legislation and a forecast of the
Feeney Amendment's impact, see infra notes 156-78 and accompanying text.
12. SeeJohn S. Martin,Jr., LetJudges Do TheirJobs, N.Y. TiMES,June 24, 2003, at
A31 ("For a judge to be deprived the ability to consider all of the factors that go
into formulating ajust sentence is completely at odds with the sentencing philosophy that has been the hallmark of the American system of justice."); see also Kennedy Address, supranote 1, at 5 ("The Federal Sentencing Guidelines [themselves]
should be revised downward.").
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II.

HISTORY OF FEDERAL SENTENCING

Judges once enjoyed broad discretion in determining whether and
for howlong to incarcerate an offender. 13 This discretion led to perceptions that "federal judges mete out an unjustifiably wide range of
sentences to offenders with similar histories, convicted of similar crimes,
committed under similar circumstances." 14 In response,
tailoring, Congress adopted the Sentencing Reform Act
Congress intended the Sentencing Reform Act to
ranted sentencing disparity by establishing a consistent

and after years of
of 1984.15
eliminate unwarsystem of federal

sentencing. 16 Consequently, Congress created the U.S. Sentencing Com13. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 92 (1996) (providing background
of federal judicial sentencing discretion).
14. Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 98-225, at 38 (1983)). Throughout history, many
legal scholars have expressed their distrust in the discretionary powers of judges.
See, e.g., JAMES F. SIMON, WHAT KIND OF NATION 9 (2002) (quoting Letter from
ThomasJefferson to Spencer Roane (Mar. 9, 1821)). For example, Thomas Jefferson wrote that "[t]he great object of my fear is the federal judiciary. That body,
like gravity, ever acting with noiseless foot & unalarming advance, [is] gaining
ground step by step .... Let the eye of vigilance never be closed." Id. (expressing
distrust in judicial discretion). Likewise, Lord Camden noted:

[T]he discretion of ajudge is the law of tyrants; it is always unknown; it is

different in different men; it is casual, and depends upon constitution,
temper and passion. In the best it is oftentimes caprice; in the worst, it is
every vice, folly and passion to which human nature can be liable.
State v. Cummings, 36 Mo. 263, 278 (1865), rev'd, 71 U.S. 277 (1867) (concerning
ex post facto law). Over a century later, Justice Ben F. Overton of the Florida Supreme Court commented:
Some writers and authorities have said that the term "judicial discretion"
is a mistake or misnomer. The term "discretion" in its English usage
means "with restraint." In the broad legal sense, however, judicial discretion denotes a very real grant of power that can be the absolute and final
authority in any given situation.
Justice Ben F. Overton, The Meaning of Judicial Discretion, in J. EIc SMITHBURN,
JUDICIAL DISCRETION 3 (1980) (analyzing judicial discretion in functional context).
15. See 18 U.S.C §§ 3551-59, 3561-66, 3571-74, 3581-86 (2003) (establishing
particularized standards within which convicted federal offenders shall be sentenced in conformity); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 (2003) (same).
16. See generally Kirby D. Behre & Jeff Ifrah, Perspectives on Federal Sentencing
Guidelines and Mandatory Sentencing: Foreword: You Be the Judge: The Success of Fifteen
Years of Sentencing Under the United States Sentencing Guidelines,40 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 5
(2003) (citing S. REP. No. 98-225, at 39 (1983), which describes legislative history
of Sentencing Reform Act and goals of legislation). The Sentencing Reform Act
was the product of years of drafting and discussions to make the Act most adequately fulfill the goals of sentencing. See generally Statements of Senators Edward
M. Kennedy and Patrick Leahy Supporting the JUDGES Act, in 15 FED. SENTENCINC REP. 372 (2003). Senator Edward M. Kennedy noted:
The Sentencing Reform Act was the result of extraordinary bipartisan cooperation. In the Senate Judiciary Committee, over a ten-year period,
Senator Thurmond, Senator Hatch, Senator Biden, and I worked with
the Carter and Reagan Administrations to strike the best balance between
the goal of consistent sentencing in federal law and the need to give federal judges discretion to make sentences fit the crime in individual cases.
There was also strong bipartisan cooperation in the House Judiciary Coin-
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mission to establish such a system through the development of a comprehensive set of sentencing guidelines.1 7 The Commission promulgated the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 18 in 1988, which specify an appropriate sentencing range for each class of convicted persons based on various factors
related to the offender and the offense. 1 9
While the Guidelines were developed to regulate the discretion of
judges, Congress struck a careful balance between the goals of sentencing
uniformity and individualized justice. 2 0

Congress recognized that the

Commission could not possibly anticipate and weigh every relevant variable that could arise in each case. 21 Accordingly, Congress granted judges
the authority to sentence outside the prescribed range if a judge finds "an
aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not ademittee, and we worked together over several years to enact a strong, balanced, and bipartisan bill.
Id. (quoting Senator Kennedy to show extensive research went into adoption of
Sentencing Reform Act).
17. See 28 U.S.C. § 991 (a) (creating U.S. Sentencing Commission). The Commission is an independent agency within the judicial branch consisting of seven
members appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. See id. (detailing composition of Commission); id. § 994 (charging Commission with developing
Guidelines).
18. See Behre & Ifrah, supra note 16, at 5 (noting original version of Guidelines implemented). The current version of the Guidelines is the product of over
six hundred amendments over the past fifteen years and is more than five hundred
pages in length. See id. (comparing original version to current one). Sentencing
guidelines are not usually amended because of Commission research or its review
of flaws within the Guidelines. See PaulJ. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, Perspectives
on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Mandatory Sentencing: The Reason Behind the
Rules: Finding and Using the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM.
CRiM. L. REv. 19, 28 (2003) (noting different reason for amendments). The
Guidelines are, however, often amended because Congress frequently directs the
Commission to increase sentences for a particular crime when a crime receives
media attention. See id. (evaluating philosophy of Guidelines).
19. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 92 (1996) (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, at 1 (1995)). The Guidelines require a district judge to impose on a defendant in the typical case a sentence falling within
the applicable Guideline range. See id. (noting operation of Guidelines). Judges
use a grid that sets up presumptive sentences according to the seriousness of the
offense and the defendant's criminal history. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANuAL ch.5, pt. A (2003) (giving model of guideline grid through "Sentencing
Table"); see also Frank 0. Bowman III, When Sentences Don't Make Sense, WASH. POST,
Aug. 15, 2003, at A27 (describing procedure for determining sentences).
20. See Letter from Bowman, supra note 3, at 1 (noting purpose of Guidelines
was to preserve individualized sentencing). Over seventy law professors, most of
whom specialize in criminal law, signed a letter supporting this position. See id.
(expressing "deep concerns" regarding legislation to eviscerate judicial discretion
through granting of downward departures); see also Allenbaugh, supra note 4, at 9
(acknowledging objective to "bring some rationality and coherence to the sentencing process while still allowing for individualized sentences where circumstances
warrant").
21. See Letter from Bowman, supra note 3, at I (noting rational reason for
allowing Guideline departures); see also Koon, 518 U.S. at 92-93 (describing necessity for ability to depart from sentencing ranges).
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quately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the [G]uidelines. ' ' 22 If the judge finds an unusual case outside the
"heartland" of typical cases the Commission considered and the Guide23
lines describe, the court may consider whether a departure is warranted.
The Commission provided only a few factors that could never be a
basis for departure and chose not to limit the considerations that might
influence a decision to depart from the Guidelines. 24 The Commission
reasoned that departure factors "cannot, by their very nature, be comprehensively listed and analyzed in advance." 25 Further, departures will not
occur often because the Guidelines seek to take into account those factors
26
that made a significant difference in pre-Guideline sentencing.
22. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2003) (permitting sentencing outside prescribed
Guideline range when aggravating or mitigating factor exists); see also Koon, 518
U.S. at 92 (addressing discretion permitted to district courts). In Koon, the Supreme Court found:
The Act did not eliminate all of the district court's discretion, however.
Acknowledging the wisdom, even the necessity, of sentencing procedures
that take into account individual circumstances ... Congress allows for
district courts to depart from the applicable Guideline range if "the court
finds there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or
to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing
Commission in formulating the guidelines should result in a sentence
different from that described."
Id. (same).
23. See U.S. SENTENCING GUmELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt.
(1995) (describing Guideline application in typical cases). The Introduction to
the Guidelines explains:
The Commission intends the sentencing courts to treat each guideline as
carving out a "heartland," a set of typical cases embodying the conduct
that each guideline describes. When a court finds an atypical case, one to
which a particular guideline linguistically applies but where conduct significantly differs from the norm, the court may consider whether a departure is warranted.
Id. (introducing circumstance warranting proper departure consideration). To
determine whether the Commission adequately considered a circumstance, courts
must consider only the Guidelines, policy statements and the Commission's official
commentary. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (instructing considerations for determining
typical case); see also Koon, 518 U.S. at 92-93 (discussing circumstances warranting
departure).
24. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES §§ 5H1.10, 5H1.12, 5H1.14, 5K2.12
(2003) (prohibiting departure based on numerous factors: race, sex, national origin, creed, religion, socioeconomic status, lack of guidance as youth, drug or alco-

hol dependence and economic hardship); see also U.S.

SENTENCING GUIDELINES

MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. 4(b) (1995) ("[These Guidelines do] not

intend to limit the kinds of factors, whether or not mentioned anywhere else in the
[G]uidelines, that could constitute grounds for departure in an unusual case.").

25.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch.

1, pt. A, introductory cmt. 4(b)

(1995) (noting departure factors cannot be listed exclusively).
26. See id. (recognizing difficulty in prescribing single set of Guidelines to encompass "vast range of human conduct potentially relevant to sentencing decision"). The Commission noted that it is empowered to write and rewrite
Guidelines, and over time, it can refine Guidelines to specify more precisely which
departures should be permitted. See id. (describing reasoning for not including
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The U.S. Supreme Court has encouraged the exercise of legislative
discretion in promulgating sentencing schemes. 27 The Court recognized,
however, that the Eighth Amendment prohibits sentences that are disproportionate to the crimes committed and enforces the constitutional principle of proportionality. 28 Accordingly, in Koon v. United States,29 the Court
approved the use of downward departures, the adjustment of a sentence
below that suggested by the Guidelines." ° Downward departures, the
listed consideration factors); see also Koon, 518 U.S. at 93-94 (citing to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual).
27. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 286 (1983) (discussing principle of proportionality in sentencing).
28. See id. (holding constitutional principle of proportionality in sentencing
"has been recognized explicitly in this Court for almost a century"); see also Allenbaugh, supra note 4, at 7 (discussing Supreme Court's views on punishment).
Despite the Court's holding in Solem, recent case law suggests that a majority of the
Court is:
[C]ontent to provide legislatures with discretion, effectively unfettered by
the Eighth Amendment, to promulgate even the most draconian of sentencing schemes. Indeed, at least two of the Justices-Scalia and
Thomas-believe that the Eighth Amendment applies only to the mode of
imposing a sanction, not to its severity: "In [our] view, the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality principle."
Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 38 (2003)
(Thomas, J., concurring)).
29. 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
30. See id. (holding downward departures are appropriate where case falls
outside "heartland" of cases considered by Guidelines). While Koon was largely
concerned with interpreting the Sentencing Reform Act, the Eighth Amendment
was most likely not the prime motivator for the decision. See generally id. (noting
connection between Koon and Eighth Amendment is reaching). In Koon, Los Angeles police officers were acquitted on state charges of assault and use of excessive
force in the beating of suspect Rodney King during his arrest. See id. at 85-91
(describing facts). As a result of the acquittal, widespread rioting and looting occurred in Los Angeles where "[m]ore than 40 people were killed in the riots, more
than 2,000 injured, and nearly $ 1 billion in property was destroyed." Id. at 88
(recording damage done by citizens' outrage at acquittal of police officers). The
police officers were convicted under federal law for violating 18 U.S.C. § 242. See
id. at 88 (noting conviction of willfully using unreasonable force in making arrest
and willfully permitting officers to use such force). The applicable Guideline
range was section 2H1.4 of the 1992 U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, indicating a sentence of seventy to eighty-seven months. See id. at 89 (calculating appropriate
points that put King in said range). The district court granted one departure
downward based on the victim's misconduct and provocation, and a second departure based on a combination of factors: officers were unusually susceptible to
abuse in prison, officers would lose their jobs, they had a low risk of recidivism and
they had been subject to successive state and federal prosecutions. See id. at 88-90
(detailing decision to depart). The sentencing range after departure was thirty to
thirty-seven months, and the court sentenced the officers to thirty months. See id.
at 90 (stating sentence rendered). The Ninth Circuit reviewed the departures de
novo and reversed. See id. (reversing district court's departures). The Supreme
Court held the appropriate standard of review was abuse of discretion and affirmed in part and reversed in part. See id. at 91 (finding appropriate question to
review was whether sentencing court abused its discretion). The Court remanded
to the district court to consider only valid factors. See id. at 113-14 ("When a re-
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Court determined, are "entirely consistent with the philosophy of the
Guidelines-which is to impose punishment that is deserved, and not arbitrary."3 I The Court found that the Commission provided significant guidance in the Guidelines as to what factors should or should not be
considered bases for departure. 3 2 In addition, the Court noted that courts
must keep "in mind the Commission's expectation that departures based
on grounds not mentioned in the Guidelines will be 'highly
33
infrequent.'

viewing court concludes a district court based a departure on both valid and invalid factors, a remand is required unless it determines the district court would have
imposed the same sentence absent reliance on the invalid factors.").
31. Mark H. Allenbaugh, The PROTECT Act's Sentencing Provisions, and the Attorney General's Controversial Memo: An Assault Against the Federal Courts (Aug. 13,
2003), at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/legislation/ci_03-41?OpenDocument
[hereinafter ControversialMemo] (discussing necessity for downward departures);
see also Koon, 518 U.S. at 92 (holding departures necessary because individual circumstances should be taken into account).
32. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 94-96 ("The Commission provides considerable guidance as to the factors that are apt or not apt to make a case atypical, by listing
certain factors as either encouraged or discouraged bases for departure."). Factors
that are encouraged are those that the Commission was not able to fully take into
account in formulating the Guidelines. See id. at 94 (quoting section 5K2.0 of U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines and providing examples of encouraged factors). Even encouraged factors will not always be grounds for departure if "on some occasions
the applicable Guideline took the encouraged factor into account." Id. at 94-95
(giving example of upward departure for disruption of government "ordinarily
would not be justified when the offense of conviction is an offense such as bribery
or obstruction ofjustice; in such cases interference with a governmental function is
inherent in the offense"). A court may depart if a factor "is present to a degree
substantially in excess of that which ordinarily is involved in the offense." Id. at 95
(citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 5K2.0). Discouraged factors are those "not
ordinarily relevant to the determination of whether a sentence should be outside
the applicable guideline range." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt.
H, introductory cmt. (1995) (acknowledging certain factors should not be factors
for departure); see, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 5H1.6 (noting family ties
and responsibilities are discouraged factors); id. § 5H1.2 (noting educational and
vocational skills are discouraged factors); id. § 5H1.11 (noting military and public
service record are discouraged factors). Discouraged factors, however, may be relied upon in exceptional cases. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt.
H, introductory cmt. (1995) (stating discouraged factors should only be taken into
account when they are exceptional in degree or they in some way bring case

outside heartland). If the factor is a forbidden factor, the sentencing court cannot
use it as a basis for departure. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 95-96 (noting departure cannot
be granted for prohibited factors); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES §§ 5H1.12,
5H1.4, 5K2.12 (prohibiting departure for lack of guidance as youth, drug or alcohol dependence or economic hardship, respectively).

33. Koon, 518 U.S. at 96 (quoting U.S.

SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch.

1,

pt. A, at 6 (1995)).
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THE CONTROVERSIAL ENACTMENT OF THE FEENEY AMENDMENT

The Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of
Children Today Act ("PROTECT Act") 34 was considered and unanimously
passed in the Senate on February 24, 2003. 3 5 This legislation focused on
strengthening the prosecution of offenses against children. 36 The House
of Representatives considered the bill on March 26, 2003. 37 Representative Thomas Feeney of Florida introduced a surprise amendment to this
legislation, which proposed to restrict downward departures in all cases to
those "specifically identified as a permissible ground of departure in the
sentencing guidelines." 3 8 According to Representative Feeney, the
Amendment is essential to the fight against child pornography and abduction and necessary to stop judges from giving offenders a "slap on the
39
wrist" at sentencing.
The matter then went to the Conference Committee, and, while it was
pending, virtually every segment of the criminal justice community voiced
40
concerns about various aspects of the so-called "Feeney Amendment."
The Conference Committee reached a compromise and, as a result, narrowed the breadth of the Amendment. 4 1 The Feeney Amendment, in its
34. Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) (consisting of Feeney Amendment and laws affecting crimes against children); United States v. VanLeer, 270 F.
Supp. 2d 1318, 1325-26 (D. Utah 2003) (discussing origin of PROTECT Act).
35. See 149 CONG. REc. S2573-90 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 2003) (noting legislation
passing in Senate).
36. For a further discussion of enacted legislation's effect on strengthening
child protection laws, see infra notes 136-55 and accompanying text.
37. See 149 CONG. REC. H2320-25 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 2003) (considering bill in
House).
38. VanLeer, 270 F. Supp. 2d at 1325-26 (citing 149 CONG. Ric. H2420-22
(daily ed. Mar. 27, 2003) and discussing Representative Feeney's rationale for
Amendment); see also Allenbaugh, supra note 4, at 8 (citing PROTECT Act).
39. See Allenbaugh, supranote 4, at 8 (stating purpose for Amendment). Representative Feeney stated:
This amendment is an essential component of legislation to fight against
child pornography and abductions. Legislative efforts to fight against
child abduction and child pornography will be a fruitless gesture if at the
end of the day judges give offenders, particularly sex offenders, a slap on
the wrist. And a slap on the wrist is exactly what is happening today, with
increasing frequency.
Id. (citing Letter from Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. & Rep. Tom Feeney to
Colleagues, Support the Feeney Amendment to H.R. 1104 to Preserve Appropriate
and Justifiable Departures Under Sentencing Guidelines (Mar. 26, 2003)). Additionally, Representative Feeney stated that the "justification for [the] restriction
was to preventjudges from 'making up exceptions... as they go along.'" VanLeer,
270 F. Supp. 2d at 1321 (describing Feeney's motivation for Amendment); see also
149 CONG. REC. H2435 (2003) (statement by Rep. Feeney) (same).
40. See Letter from Sands, supra note 5 (urging Commission to preserve use of
downward departures).
41. See H.R. CONE. REP. No. 108-66, tit. IV (2003) (noting compromised
amendment); see also VanLeer, 270 F. Supp. 2d at 1322 (noting bipartisan agreement reached). The proposed version of the Feeney Amendment would have
eliminated nine specified downward departures, including ones frequently relied
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altered form, was agreed upon by both the House and Senate and was
included in the PROTECT Act, which was signed into law on April 30,
2003.42

Surprisingly, the Feeney Amendment, adopted under the guise of the
PROTECT Act, passed through the legislature with virtually no discussion
or debate and no public hearings on the Amendment's effects on sentencing law, policy and practice. 43 The introduction of the Amendment was
supported without any input solicited from the federal judiciary, the or-

upon. See Alan Vinegrad, The New FederalSentencing Law, 15 FED. SENTENCING REP.
310, 310-13 (2003) (discussing changes from original to adopted version of Feeney
Amendment). The statute would have eliminated departures based on aberrant
behavior under section 5K2.20 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. See id. (same). Additionally and more controversially, the ability to depart if any mitigating factor not
taken into account by the Commission was found would have been abolished. See
id. (discussing proposed elimination of departure under section 5K2.0 of U.S. Sentencing Guidelines). This residual departure method was explicitly approved in Koon
v. United States. See generally 518 U.S. 81 (1996) (holding departures constitutional
if factor based upon takes defendant outside heartland of cases). This would have
precluded judges from considering the defendant or the offense individually. The
ability to upwardly depart if an aggravating factor not considered was found, however, was not taken away. See 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2003) (containing no prohibition on
upwardly departing if aggravators found). For a further discussion of departure
limitations under the Feeney Amendment, see infra notes 47-135 and accompanying text.
42. See generally PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) (containing Feeney Amendment). The compromise version has been called the
"Hatch-Sensenbrenner-Graham Compromise Amendment" but is most popularly
known as the Feeney Amendment. See 149 CONG. REc. S517-01 (daily ed. Apr. 10,
2003) (statement of Sen. Hatch); see also supra note 2 (observing terms "PROTECT
Act" and "Feeney Amendment" used interchangeably). The PROTECT Act is additionally famous for containing the federal version of "AMBER Alert," legislation
detailing the procedure for reporting on missing children over national broadcast
systems. See PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, §§ 301-05, 321-23, 341, 361, 363,
117 Stat. 650, 660-67 (2003) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5601, 5791,
5777, 5773, 5792, 13001, 13004 (2003) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 3056, 3796 (2003)) (including "AMBER Alert" system legislation). One commentator noted that a "vote
against AMBER Alert would have been like a vote against motherhood and few
legislators were willing to have to defend such a vote to their constituents." Lawrence S. Goldman, From the President: The Feeney Amendment, 27 CHAMPION 4 (2003)
(discussing passing of PROTECT Act). For a further discussion of the AMBER
Alert system, see infra notes 138-44 and accompanying text.
43. See H.R. 1104, 108th Cong. § 243 (2003) (noting vote of 357 to 58 passed
legislation); see also Allenbaugh, supra note 4, at 8 (noting "unprecedented scope
of the legislation, coupled with the fact that it was rammed through the legislature"); Letter from Bowman, supra note 3, at 1 (noting adoption of Feeney Amendment by House with virtually no debate). One commentator expressed his
discontent, stating that "[t]he manner in which the Feeney Amendment was enacted revealed our legislative process at its very worst. These issues are too important to our criminal justice system and the separation of powers to be decided in
such a hurried, thoughtless manner." Goldman, supra note 42, at 4 (discussing
Feeney Amendment from perspective of Lawrence S. Goldman, President of
NACDL).
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ganized bar, legal academics, criminal justice experts or even the
Commission.4 4
Attorney General John Ashcroft stated that the Feeney Amendment
was designed to ensure that the Guidelines "would be more faithfully and
consistently enforced" and "to ensure that the incidence of downward departures [is] substantially reduced. '45 In reality, the Feeney Amendment
is designed to increase the actual penalties imposed against federally convicted individuals by strictly limiting, barring and, ultimately, intimidating
federal judges from considering different factors that allow for leniency in
46
sentencing in individual cases.
IV.

DEVASTATION TO JUDGES

The Feeney Amendment displays significant disrespect for the historic role that judges have had in the sentencing process. 47 The responsibility of imposing sentences on defendants is a "sensitive task" that is
entrusted only to those qualified. 48 Nevertheless, this legislation threatens
judicial discretion and authority by considerably curtailing the use of the
downward departure and by placing judges under heightened scrutiny. 4 9
While eliminating disparity in sentencing is an important goal of the
Guidelines, the main goal should be individualized justice. 50 In Koon, the
Supreme Court stated that "[i]t has been uniform and constant in the
federal judicial tradition for the sentencing judge to consider every convicted person as an individual and every case as a unique study in the
human failings that sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime
and the punishment to ensue." 5 1 Federal defendants are often individuals
44. See Vinegrad, supra note 41, at 314-15 (expressing dissatisfaction with legislative process when Feeney Amendment was passed).
45. Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Attorney General, to All Federal Prosecutors, Department Policies and Procedure Concerning Sentencing Recommendations and Sentencing Appeals (July 28, 2003) [hereinafter Memorandum from
Ashcroft] (citations omitted) (providing purpose of Feeney Amendment).
46. See Prison Talk, Feeney Amendment-Sentencing Practices Part 2, at http://
www.prisontalk.com/forums/showthread.php?t=12464&highlight-Feeney (last visited Jan. 26, 2004) (summarizing impact of Feeney Amendment and analyzing its
different sections); see also Martin, supra note 12, at A31 ("These amendments are
an effort to intimidate judges to follow sentencing guidelines.").
47. See Vinegrad, supra note 41, at 315 (contending legislation shows extraordinary disrespect for federal judges).
48. See id. (noting federal judges must be nominated by President and confirmed by Senate to serve).
49. See id. (suggesting legislation is direct attack on judges).
50. See Zachary L. Berman,Judge Martin Leaves Bench Critical of Sentencing Rules,
N.Y.LJ., Aug. 15, 2003, at 2 (noting goal of Guidelines). Judge Martin stated, "I
could end all disparity by simply hanging everyone who commits a crime," but
explained individual justice should be the main goal of sentencing. Id. (quoting
U.S. Southern District of New York Judge John S. Martin who implies that easy
solution is not correct one).
51. Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996) (noting tradition of individualized sentencing); see also Berman, supra note 50, at 2 (quoting same).
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who were not only initially dealt a bad hand in life, but had limited opportunities offered to them throughout. 52 Typically, judges recognize this
53
and do allow compassion to influence their sentences when appropriate.
The use of departures has been the mechanism of compassion that judges
54
utilize to attain individualized sentences.
The use of downward departures does not equate to an overwhelming
amount of mitigation in sentencing, as the enactment of the Feeney
Amendment implies. 55 Departures also do not indicate judges' recalcitrance by being "soft on crime."' 56 Judges generally sentence in accordance with the law and according to the applicable Guidelines. 57 Judges
who depart are not giving criminals a "break," but are ensuring that their
sentences are just. 58 Ajudge should only depart when the sentence range
52. See Berman, supra note 50, at 2-3 (recognizing judges become aware of
defendant's unfortunate circumstances). One commentator described the process
one judge endures during sentencing:
When [Judge Martin] examines the backgrounds of many defendants
who come before him for drug-related crimes, Judge Martin said he generally finds "people who leave school in the ninth grade and come from
single parent homes, sometimes with addicted parents." These people
have few opportunities, Judge Martin said, "the choice is to go be a dishwasher in a restaurant or sell drugs. When you are talking about retribution for these people, it is hard to get on a moral high horse."
Id. (providing one judge's reflection on defendants' individual situations).
53. See id. (demonstrating how Judge Martin allows his compassion to influence his sentencing).
54. See id. at 3 (utilizing departures to show compassion in sentencing).
55. See id. (providing examples of "tougher" sentencing practices).
56. ControversialMemo, supra note 31 (pointing out misconception that departures mean judges are being too lenient).
57. See Vinegrad, supra note 41, at 315 ("Statistics show that [federal judges]
have, by and large, discharged this responsibility consistent with the letter and
spirit of the Guidelines."). The thrust of the debate has been about what happens
with the majority of departures. There are occasions, however, where some departures may be considered foolish or at least highly suspect. See, e.g., United States v.
Roach, 296 F.3d 565 (7th Cir. 2002) (providing example of appellate court reversing district court's questionable departure). In Roach, the district court granted a
downward departure at sentencing, finding the defendant suffered from a serious
mental condition that made it nearly impossible to control her "shopping binges."
See id. at 566-68 (discussing facts and district court ruling). The appellate court
noted that in order to depart on mental defect, the defendant must suffer from a
"significantly reduced mental capacity." See id. at 568 (relying on section 5K2.12 of
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines). The court held that evidence of compulsive shopping
behavior is insufficient, without more, to support a departure and remanded the
case for resentencing. See id. at 569-73 (analyzing claim).
58. See ControversialMemo, supra note 31 (describing one districtjudge's downward departure in VanLeer as not being "soft" but as being just). United States v.
VanLeer provides a good example of when a downward departure is warranted in
order to make a sentence just. Paul Bradley VanLeer, the defendant, was found
guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 9 2 2 (g) (1). See
United States v. VanLeer, 270 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1319-20 (D. Utah 2003) (stating
facts). VanLeer had a friend store his shotgun while he was in prison and when
VanLeer had finished serving his sentence, he picked up the gun and took it to a
local pawnshop because he needed rent money. See id. at 1319 (same). Techni-
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proposed by the Guidelines is, according to the judge, more severe than
59

what the offender deserves.
Despite the availability of downward departures, many judges have
not shied away from meting out tough sentences. 60 Since Congress first
enacted the Guidelines, the federal prison population has increased almost five hundred percent to a total of over two million. 61 This is hardly
evidence of a lenient judiciary. 62 Statistics indicate that on average, downward departures were granted only in about twelve percent of federal
cases. 63 Proponents of the Amendment focused on the substantial increase in non-cooperation departures since Koon was decided in 1996.64
The increase, however, was attributable to "fast track" departures granted
in border districts with high immigration caseloads, accounting for seventy
percent of departures cases. 65 In addition, government motions for downward departures for cooperating defendants account for approximately
cally, VanLeer committed the federal crime of a "felon in possession of a firearm."
See id. at 1319 (acknowledging actions of defendant constituted crime). The court
found that a downward departure under section 5K2.11 of the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelineswas warranted because this case did not involve the harms envisioned by
Congress when it enacted felon-in-possession laws and was outside the heartland of
cases supported by the Guideline range. See id. at 1326-27 (deciding case fell
outside heartland and departure was necessary). While the Guidelines called for
thirty to thirty-seven months, the court sentenced VanLeer to eighteen months.
See id. at 1320, 1327 (imposing sentence).
59. See Allenbaugh, supra note 4, at 10 (noting "downward departures are not
granted out of mercy" but only where warranted).
60. See Berman, supra note 50, at 1 (providing examples of when one judge
upwardly departed and gave harsher sentences). Many severe sentences, however,
are often the result of mandatory minimums over which judges have no control.
See Talk Left, Justice Breyer Raps Mandatory Minimums (Sept. 22, 2003), at http://
www.talkleft.com/archives/004359.html (discussing Justice Breyer's denouncement of mandatory minimum sentences).
61. See Cokie Roberts & Steven Roberts, Sentencing Modification Gains Some Unlikely Allies, NASHVILLE CITY PAPER, Aug. 29, 2003, at http://www.nashvillecitypaper.
com/index.cfm?section=40&screen=news&newsid=26106 (acknowledging rise in
prison sentences since Guidelines enacted).
62. See id. (stating "[t]he 'lock 'em up and throw away the key' crowd is riding
high in Washington"). Consider the words ofJustice Kennedy, encouraging a perception of inmates as more than criminals and advocating that "the more than 2
million inmates in the United States are human beings whose minds and spirits we
must try to reach." Id. (quoting Justice Kennedy).
63. See Vinegrad, supranote 41, at 314 (providing that, since Koon, departure
rates average 12.2% of cases); see alsoJonathon Groner, Panel Caught in Tussle over
Judges' Power; Lauyers: Sentencing Commission Should Resist Effort to Curb Bench, LEGAL
TIMES, Aug. 18, 2003, at 1 (reporting downward departures in 7.5% to 12.2% of all
federal cases).
64. SeeVinegrad, supra note 41, at 314 (providing non-cooperation departure
rates increased from 4,201 in 1996 to 10,026 in 2001).
65. See id. (discussing "fast track" departures). Fast track departures were implemented to alleviate burdens placed on prosecutors and district courts. See id.
(revealing necessity for departure). Congress has even directed the Commission
to create a guideline for this practice. See id. (directing implementation of guideline in response).
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705

eighteen percent. 6 6 There has even been a recommendation in recent
67
years that judges should depart in more cases.
The Feeney Amendment interferes with a judge's discretionary authority by limiting the availability of downward departures. The legislation
eliminates the use of specific downward departure grounds when sentencing sexual abuse, child-victim and obscenity offenses. 68 No longer can a
judge consider departures in these cases based on, inter alia, aberrant behavior, family ties, community ties or military, civic or public service when
sentencing a convicted defendant.6 9 Although the actual legislation is
much narrower in scope than the proposed version, which tried to eradicate virtually all downward departures, it still considerably limits ajudge's
discretion. 70 A person found guilty of these specified offenses must now
be treated as a category instead of an individual under the law.
Concomitantly, although the Feeney Amendment only explicitly takes
away ajudge's ability to depart in a minority of cases, the legislation might
implicitly cause judges to rethink and possibly refrain from departing.
The Amendment requires prosecutors to report to the Department ofJustice (DOJ) when a judge departs against the DOJ's objection. 71 This new

66. See id. (noting government-supported departures make up majority of
departures).
67. See Letter from Sands, supra note 5 (noting personal experience that
judges grant too few departures where they are warranted).
68. See 18 U.S.C. § 3552 (2003) (removing ability to depart); 28 U.S.C. § 994
(2003) (same); see also Vinegrad, supra note 41, at 313 (noting changes to original
Feeney version eliminated these departure grounds entirely while enacted version
eliminated them only in regard to certain crimes).
69. See 18 U.S.C. § 3552 (removing ability to depart and certain considerations in sentencing offenders); 28 U.S.C. § 994 (same). These grounds for downward departures are still available in cases not involving sexual abuse, a child-victim
or obscenity. See Vinegrad, supra note 41, at 313 (discussing changes to originally
proposed amendment).
70. See Vinegrad, supra note 41, at 314-16 (discussing negative impact of Feeney Amendment). One senator noted, however, that the type of cases affected by
this limitation represent only two percent of the federal caseload. See 149 CONG.
REc. S5113 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003) (statement of Sen. Sessions) (emphasizing
constraint of Feeney Amendment).
71. See Memorandum from Ashcroft, supranote 45 (instructing prosecutors to
report when judges depart). The Feeney Amendment requires the attorney general to submit a report to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees within fifteen days whenever a district judge departs downward in a case for reasons other
than substantial assistance to the government. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2003) (reporting departures by judges to DOJ). The effective date for this amendment was suspended for ninety days. See id. (detailing requirements for indefinite suspension).
It will be suspended indefinitely if the attorney general takes steps to ensure vigorous pursuit of appealing unjustified downward departures. See id. (same).
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reporting requirement will intimidate judges into not departing for fear of
73
being reversed. 7 2 This reporting system will effectively blacklist judges.
Likewise, this reporting system devastates the fundamental separation
of powers among the branches.74 Judges' records are already open and
available to the public and can be used to get statistical evidence about
sentencing. 7 5 Reporting to the executive agency on individual judges for
conducting a specific aspect of their routine business is surely interference
76
with the ideal structure of the federal system.
The Feeney Amendment further requires de novo appellate review of
departure decisions, thereby overruling the Supreme Court's decision in
72. See BlacklistingJudges, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2003, § 4, at 10 [hereinafter
BlacklistingJudges] (discussing effect of reporting system). This "blacklisting" incentivizes judges to refrain from departing (out of fear of being reversed). See id.
(noting reporting system is attempt "to make federal judges yield to political pressures from Washington"); see also Steve Karnowski, Courts:JudgeCriticizesFederalSentencing Policies, PIONEER PRESS, Oct. 22, 2003, available at http://www.twincities.
com/mld/pioneerpress/2003/10/news/nation/7070526.htm?templa
(providing
example of intimidated judge). U.S. District Judge Paul Magnuson admitted to
feeling intimidated when explaining his decision not to grant a downward departure. See id. (blaming Congress and DOJ for feeling intimidated). When asked to
respond to Judge Magnuson's concerns, Judge Donovan Frank replied:
Do I share Judge Magnuson's concerns about where all this is going to
go, where it relates to the independence of the judiciary? Yes .. . , [b]ut

have I changed how I do my sentencing? No, I have not. I don't feel
intimidated and I'm not any less likely to depart up or down than I was.
Id. (offering contrary opinion that he felt no intimidation).
73. See BlacklistingJudges, supra note 72, at 10 (discussing blacklist effect of
providing names of judges who depart to DOJ); see also 149 CONG. Rc. S5137
(daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003) (statement of Sen. Leahy) ("The [final] language retains
the Feeney amendment's attempt to intimidate Federal judges by compiling a 'hit
list' of all judges who impose sentences that the Justice Department does not
like .... It takes a sledge hammer to the concept of separation of powers."); Emily
Bazelon, With No Sentencing Leeway, What's Left to Judge?, WASH. POST, May 4, 2003,
at B04 ("In other words, the prosecutors are saying: We're watching you.").
74. See Albert J. Krieger, A Wave and a Wish, 18 CrIM. JusT. 1, 29 (2003) (discussing separation of powers implications of Feeney Amendment's reporting system). The likely response to this argument by proponents of the Amendment
could possibly be that federal prosecutors work for the DOJ, and therefore, this is
just a coordinated, information-gathering approach. For a further discussion of
separation of powers issues in sentencing, see infra notes 102-08 and accompanying text.
75. See Krieger, supra note 74, at 29 (noting court records are public).
76. See id. (discussing separation of powers issues of Feeney Amendment).
One criminal defense attorney eloquently stated:
Requiring the names of the judges who downwardly depart to be reported to Congress brings sickening recollections of the list of names
waved by Senator Joe McCarthy. It is almost too obvious to mention that
the legislature funds the other two branches of government. It is axiomatic that the purse strings can be the hangman's noose.
Id. (emphasizing discontent with reporting requirement of Feeney Amendment);
see also Vinegrad, supra note 41, at 315 (recommending that bar and academics
focus attention on Feeney Amendment's separation of powers issues).
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Koon.77 This standard of review offers less deference to the sentencing
judge than the formerly applied "abuse of discretion" standard afforded. 78
De novo review makes it much easier for a district judge to be reversed on
appeal because all it takes is a simple disagreement by the appellate
court. 79 This change in standard, coupled with the reporting requirements, can only intrude on ajudge's realm of discretion to which the decision to depart has been traditionally reserved. 80
77. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2003) (" [T] he court of appeals shall review de
novo the district court's application of the guidelines to the facts."), with Koon v.
United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996) (finding abuse of discretion appropriate standard of review for departure appeals); see also Allenbaugh, supra note 4, at 8 (stating Feeney Amendment overrules Koon). For a further discussion of the facts and
holding of Koon, see supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
78. Compare BLACK's LAw Dic-rioNARY 94 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "appeal de
novo" as "[a]n appeal in which the appellate court uses the trial court's record but
reviews the evidence and law without deference to the trial court's rulings"), with
id.at 10 (defining "abuse of discretion" as "[a]n appellate court's standard for
reviewing a decision that is asserted to be grossly unsound, unreasonable, or
illegal").
When questioned on the Feeney Amendment's change in standard of review,
Assistant Federal Public Defender Anne Blanchard commented:
It would be all too easy to misconstrue this change as a minor modification to
a rather technical legal standard. In practice, it is anything but minor or technical.
The nuances that are gleaned at sentencing hearings often tip the scales ever so
slightly in favor of or against a downward departure. Districtjudges are not merely
listening for the bare facts. They are making the myriad of personal observations
which inform their ultimate view of an issue. For example, they see and hear the
actual effect on the family member who will be without their sole means of support. They hear first hand the insight the doctor provides as to why the diminished mental capacity contributed so mightily to a defendant's involvement with
the crime. They evaluate the witnesses one by one as they come before the court to
tell of the defendant's extraordinary efforts and success at rehabilitation and restitution to the victims. The merits of proposed departures often turn on such intangibles as demeanor, credibility, genuine remorse or whether a certain
defendant or circumstance is truly extraordinary. The nuances that are available
to a district court in deciding these matters are simply unavailable to a court reviewing a cold record. While we would never permit a system whereby guilt was
determined by ajury who was only given a transcript of a trial, this is precisely what
the Protect Act mandates with respect to appeals of equally delicate sentencing
matters. A further result of this change in the standard of review is that the government gets a second bite of the apple. They can relitigate all departure motions
with the appellate court with the advantage that none of the nuances the district
court relied upon and perhaps very little of the real world justice the district court
was trying to achieve will be brought to bear on the ultimate sentence the individual will receive. Such a state of affairs is both unwise and unjust.
E-mail from Anne Blanchard, Assistant Federal Public Defender, District of New
Jersey, to Patrice Stappert (Apr. 2, 2004, 05:52:43 EST) (on file with author).
79. See Vinegrad, supra note 41, at 315 (noting appellate courts may reverse
district courts "simply because they disagree with them").
80. See Berman, supra note 50, at 12 (discussing pressure on judges). After
being asked what advice a retiring judge had for new judges, the judge responded
that new judges should not be afraid to take risks or worry about being reversed
because departing from the Guidelines is "precisely [the issue] that district judges
should most be willing to risk reversal." Id. (urging newjudges to ignore possibility
of reversal).
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The Feeney Amendment also heightens the writing requirements for
district judges by demanding a judge state with specificity every possible
alternative ground for departure or risk forfeiting that departure ground
on remand. 8 1 The PROTECT Act requires districtjudges in virtually every
instance to state their reasons for departures "with specificity in the written order of judgment and commitment." 82 Although this heightened
writing standard furthers the goal of a reasoned and structured sentencing
system, the district judge loses the ability to make departures on remand if
these departure grounds were not specifically included in the judge's orig83
inal sentence.
In addition, the composition of the Commission was altered to limit
judicial representation. Before the Feeney Amendment, the Commission
consisted of seven voting members, of which at least three had to be federaljudges. 84 Under the Feeney Amendment, no more than three federal
judges may serve on the Commission at one time. 85 By providing a maximum instead of a minimum number ofjudges, the Commission conceivably could lack judicial representation once the current judges' terms
expire. 8 6 This alteration is both illogical and inexplicable as it is the
judges on the Commission who bring invaluable first-hand knowledge of
sentencing.
V. THE FEENEY AMENDMENT FRUSTRATES THE SYSTEM
The Feeney Amendment makes a variety of changes related to federal
sentencing procedures. 87 While it may appease Congress, it frustrates
each major player in the game of sentencing to an unparalleled degree.
Defense counsel, prosecutors and the U.S. Sentencing Commission have
all been adversely affected by this legislation. 8 8
81. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2003) (demanding reasons for departure must "be
stated with specificity in the written order ofjudgment and commitment"); see also
id. § 3742 (limiting review to written reasons).
82. Id. § 3553 (requiring specificity).
83. See id. § 3742 (limiting departures on remand). For a further discussion
on the limitation to depart on remand, see infra notes 89-97 and accompanying
text.
84. See 28 U.S.C. § 991 (a) (2003) (establishing composition of Commission).
85. See id. (striking "[a]t least three" and inserting "[n]ot more than 3" in
statute); see also Vinegrad, supra note 41, at 314 (noting Feeney Amendment limited judicial representation on Commission).
86. See Vinegrad, supra note 41, at 314 (noting possible implications of maximum judge requirement). One commentator noted this change is a "discrete but
unmistakable slap at the federal judiciary." Id. (acknowledging deliberate effect of
change). Currently, there are four federal judges on the Commission. See Groner,
supra note 63, at 1 (providing current status of judges on Commission).
87. See Memorandum from Ashcroft, supra note 45 (describing Feeney
Amendment as "landmark piece of legislation").
88. For a further discussion of the Feeney Amendment's adverse effects, see
infra notes 89-135 and accompanying text.
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Defense

The Feeney Amendment detrimentally impacts defense counsel and
their clients. The Amendment forces defense counsel to raise every conceivable basis for departure or risk permanent waiver in any future remand.8 9 Essentially, the Amendment disrupts the defense's strategy and
compels the defense to argue the departure issue far more thoroughly
than it otherwise would have had to absent the Amendment's waiver
90

consequences.
Before the PROTECT Act, "[mlost seasoned defense attorneys ...
would follow the wise adage 'quit while you're ahead,' and sit down with-

91
out pressing for specific rulings on the alternative departure grounds."
This was because the arguments would be preserved on remand because,
while defense counsel raised the alternative departure grounds, they declined to specifically press the judge to rule upon them. 92 Now, defense
counsel is effectively forced to seek and obtain written rulings on every
possible basis or alternative basis for a downward departure, lest these po-

89. See 18 U.S.C. § 3 7 42(g) (2003) (restricting district court's ability to depart
downward on remand); see also id. § 3553(c) (requiring district court to state reasons for departure with specificity); Lisa A. Cahill & Kevin F. Clines, Waiver Dangers
Under the PROTECT Act, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 25, 2003, at 4 (discussing Feeney Amendment's effect on defense attorneys).
90. See Cahill & Clines, supra note 89, at 4-6 (discussing impact on defense
attorneys).
91. Id. (describing defense attorneys' tactical approach). To illustrate the effects of the Amendment the authors provide the following hypothetical:
In the pre-sentence submission, defense counsel argues for a downward
departure based on the client's cooperation, his voluntary disclosure of
the offense, and the aberrant nature of the offense, all recognized departure bases under the guidelines (U.S.S.G. §§ 5Kl.1, 5K2.16, 5K2.20). The
government opposes all departures. The district court begins the sentencing proceeding by announcing that the defendant's cooperation
does warrant a departure, and that the defendant will be sentenced to
time served based on that departure ground alone. The court avoids as
moot any ruling on the "aberrant nature" or "voluntary disclosure"
grounds for departure.... [U]nder the new act, if the government successfully appealed the one departure ground ruled upon by the district
court.., on remand the sentencing court would be barred from considering alternative departure grounds not specifically included in the original sentence.
Id. (providing illustration of effects of Amendment).
92. See id. (noting procedure before PROTECT Act). Typically, parties are
restricted from raising any new arguments on remand that they did not make in
connection with their original sentencing. See United States v. Quintieri, 306 F.3d
1217, 1227 (2d Cir. 2002), cert. denied sub nom., Donato v. United States, 123 S. Ct.
2246 (2003) (discussing "mandate rule"). An argument, however, is "not considered waived on resentencing if the party did not, at the time of the purported
waiver, 'have both an opportunity and an incentive to raise it before the sentencing court or on appeal.'" Cahill & Clines, supra note 89, at 6 (citing Quintieri,306
F.3d at 1229).
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tential departures be waived on remand. 3 Defense counsel must press
the court and insist that it rule on every alternative basis for departure and
94
include those accepted grounds in the written ruling.
The rule also imposes significant extra costs and pressures on the defense. Additional time researching and drafting possible departure
grounds amount to greater financial costs to the defendant and greater
temporal costs to the attorney. 95 Sentencing hearings that might have
taken a short time will be dragged out so debates can occur over departure
grounds that might never affect the sentencing.9 6 Furthermore, the rule
has the potential to flood appellate courts with ineffective assistance of
97
counsel claims.
An amendment that purports to treat each defendant and each case
alike inevitably will frustrate defense counsel. The defense's role is hard
98
enough with the uneven playing field of the current judicial system.
Typically, defense counsel gets the case long after the prosecution conducts a full investigation, gathered and examined evidence and interviewed witnesses.99 The resources available to defense counsel are
93. See Cahill & Clines, supra note 89, at 4 (discussing practicalities of
amendments).
94. See id. at 6 ("[D]efense counsel must now find a way to insist politely but
firmly that the initial sentencing court rule on every alternative basis for departure
and that it include those accepted bases in the written statement of reasons for the
departure in the judgment and commitment order.").
95. See id. (noting hardships placed on defense counsel).
96. See id. (considering significantly longer sentencing proceedings). This
lengthened time commitment will burden the courts by creating backups for .each
judge and prosecutor. See id. (same).
97. See id. ("[I]t is an 'ineffective assistance' minefield for the unwitting lawyer
who thought it was always not only safe but smart practice to quit while ahead.").
98. See generally H. RICHARD UVILLER, THE TILTED PLAYING FIELD (1999) (analyzing fairness of criminal justice system). The author acknowledges that in the
existing system, the adversaries in a criminal case will not be evenly endowed. See
id. at 279 (discussing inequalities in current system depending on defendant's
guilt). The author poses to the reader:
[H]ave we at least settled on a working definition of what we mean by
fair? At least, are we agreed that we do not mean what sports fans would
consider fair-that is, an evenly matched contest? Playing on a level playing field? I suppose one might say that, absent gross oppression, what is
fair in the criminal justice system-as in life in general-is what is familiar . . . . I must say it seems to me that the American system for the
delivery of criminal justice, while tilted in many respects, is not out of
balance in that, in the main, it embodies a fair distribution of licenses
and limits to the parties, an allocation that closely corresponds to their
differing functions in the process. It is, in other words, tolerably fair.
Id. at 305-07 (concluding system is workable).
99. See generally id. at 73-112 (considering resources available in adversarial
system); see also MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES:
CASES, STATUTES, AND EXECUTIVE MATERIALS

675 (2d ed. 2003) ("During the earli-

est phases of the criminal process, defense lawyers are rarely to be seen."). While
the defense usually does not have the opportunity to begin its case until much later
in the process, a considerable amount of value should be given to the method's
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generally minimal compared to those available to the prosecution.1 00
Often the defense counsel's only line of defense is to argue that the defendant's individual circumstance warrants a departure from the severity of
the applicable Guideline range.
B.

Prosecution

The Feeney Amendment significantly affects federal prosecutors.
While the sentencing system already gives the prosecution considerable
discretion, the Feeney Amendment purports to increase its power even
more. 10 1 The rationale for this increase of prosecutorial power in the sentencing process is unfounded and inappropriate.
Traditionally, the federal prosecutor's discretion to determine what
charges to bring was counterbalanced in sentencing by judges who determined the actual sentence to be imposed. 10 2 Trends over the last twenty
years have greatly eroded the separation between charging and sentencing, basically shifting both to the prosecution.10 3 Prosecutors decide "who
to charge, what to charge, what plea to accept and, increasingly, what the
sentence, or at least sentencing range, is."1 0 4 Despite their already deeply
rooted and overwhelming discretion, prosecutors in U.S. Attorneys' Ofattempt to ensure the government is only indicting people after full investigations.
See generally id. at 797-836 (supporting necessity for complete investigation).
100. See MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 99, at 797-836 (comparing system resources as whole and pertaining to financial resources of individual defendants).
101. For a discussion of the increase in prosecutorial discretion granted by
the PROTECT Act, see infra notes 102-21 and accompanying text.
102. See Ian Weinstein, Perspectives on Federal Sentencing Guidelines and
Mandatory Sentencing: Fifteen Years After the Federal Sentencing Revolution: How
Mandatory Minimums Have Undermined Effective and Just Narcotics Sentencing, 40 AM.
CRiM. L. REv. 87, 103 (2003) (tracing history of prosecutorial discretion).
103. See id. (noting trend to combine power over charging and sentencing).
Three trends occurred which shifted the power both to charge and sentence to the
prosecutor, particularly in federal narcotics cases. See id. (discussing trends). It
has been described that:
The first trend is accelerating overcriminalization. Federal authorities
now have jurisdiction over a greater range of conduct and can bring
charges from an ever-expanding menu of more specific and serious
charges. The second trend is the emergence of mandatory minimum
sneering statutes that have turned the power to charge into power to dictate the sentence. Charging and sentencing are much more tightly
bound than they were under old law. A third trend, increasingly harsh
sentences, has made the increase in discretion more significant because
prosecutors not only have more control over cases, but they also wield a
bigger stick when they exercise that authority.
Id. (detailing trends).
104. Goldman, supra note 42, at 4 (expressing disgust with prosecutorial desire for more power over sentencing). The author points out that "[flour out of
five downward departures from the Sentencing Guidelines are requested by prosecutors. But the one out of five that a judge imposes without their agreement
bothers them. They want to eliminate or greatly curtail these departures." Id.
(commenting on prosecution's motivation).
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fices and the DOJ lobbied and pressed the Feeney Amendment through
105

Congress to gain more.

Under the new legislation, the attorney general is directed to take
certain steps toward aggressively appealing improper downward departures. 10 6 Accordingly, Attorney General Ashcroft issued a memorandum
that outlined the DOJ's policies on downward departures and the appeals
process to all federal prosecutors. 10 7 Ashcroft instructed federal prosecutors to "acquiesce" to departures only in rare occurrences and appeal in
08

far more cases.1

Studies show, however, that a prosecutor almost never appeals when a
judge gives a defendant a lesser sentence than the Guidelines recommend.1 0 9 The low appeal rate suggests that most prosecutors do not disagree when a judge gives a particular defendant leniency. 110 When these
limited appeals are made, the circuit courts reverse the departures granted
by the district courts in the majority of cases, signifying that courts are not
reluctant to reverse arguable departure decisions. 11'
105. See Bazelon, supra note 73, at B04 (noting Feeney Amendment was
driven by prosecutors).
106. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2003) (encouraging efforts to appeal departure
decisions).
107. See Controversial Memo, supra note 31 (discussing Ashcroft Memorandum); see also Memorandum from Ashcroft, supra note 45 (detailing appropriate
action under PROTECT Act by prosecutors).
108. See Memorandum from Ashcroft, supra note 45 ("Government acquiescence in a downward departure should be, as the Guidelines Manual itself suggests, a 'rare occurenc[e]'. . . . Department attorneys also have an affirmative
obligation to oppose any sentencing adjustments, including downward departures,
that are not supported by the facts and the law."); see also ControversialMemo, supra
note 31 (instructing prosecutors to resist departures); Groner, supra note 63, at 1
(discussing Ashcroft's instruction to appeal in far more cases).
109. See Bazelon, supra note 73, at B04 (discussing appeal statistics).
110. See id. (finding "most prosecutors agree, or at least are not outraged,
when a judge thinks a defendant deserves leniency"). Federal prosecutors appealed in only 282 cases from 1991 to 2002, which is less than 0.1% of the time. See
id. (providing statistics); see also Letter from Bowman, supranote 3, at 3 (explaining
low appeal rate by prosecutors).
111. See Letter from Bowman, supra note 3, at 1 (stating that even under Koon
standard of review courts were "not shy about reversing legally questionable departures"); see also U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2001 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATisTics tbl. 58 (2002) (providing that in fiscal year 2001, circuit courts
reversed departures in more than seventy-five percent of rare cases in which government appealed); Bazelon, supra note 73, at B04 (finding "[t]he prosecutors
who fought to curtail judges' discretion did so to increase their own"). Studies
'show that "[i]n 2001, judges nationally 'departed downward' from the Guidelines
in only 18 percent of cases or in about 10,000 of 55,000 cases." Id. (providing
statistics). Further inquiry revealed that "[a ] bout 6,000 of [these] departures were
in five districts along the Mexican border, where courts often reduce sentences to
'fast track' immigration violations with the assent of the U.S. Attorneys' offices
there." Id. (explaining in majority of cases departures are encouraged by
prosecutors).
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Additionally, the new legislation, consistent with the instructions
given by Ashcroft, requires prosecutors to report to the DOJ when a judge
grants a departure over a prosecutor's objection. 112 As a result, the decision to appeal, which is normally reserved to the prosecutor, is shifted to
the DOJ. 113 When most departures come at the behest of the prosecu11 4
tion, it seems injudicious to place this undeserved pressure on judges.
Further, Ashcroft's memorandum strengthens the DOJ's dominion
1 15
over the practice of plea-bargaining and ultimately discourages its use.
While prosecutors request departures based on several factors, the typical
request is for the substantial assistance the defendant provides during the
course of the investigation.1 6 This cooperation provides prosecutors with
112. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2003) (requiring prompt notification by attorneys
to DOJ in Washington); see also Memorandum from Ashcroft, supra note 45 (instructing prosecutors to report when judges depart); ControversialMemo, supra note
31 (same). The Ashcroft Memorandum requires the prosecutor to file the report
within fourteen days after the judge imposed the adverse departure. See id. (providing time limit for reporting).
113. See BlacklistingJudges, supra note 72, at 10 (discussing shift in decisionmaking power). One analyst stated:
Under the new law, federal prosecutors will be required in many cases to
report when ajudge departs downward from the sentence recommended
by the federal guidelines ....
At the very least, the Ashcroft plan would
subject federal prosecutors to an unusual, and undesirable, degree of topdown management. Right now, individual prosecutors decide when to
appeal ajudge's sentence. Mr. Ashcroft seems to want that decision to be
a review from Washington. A prosecutor who feels a given judge is consistently handing out sentences that are too mild can certainly let his or
her feelings be known to superiors. This new, rigorous and rigid reporting system seems to treat prosecutors as lackeys, and also as some kind of
minor civil servants who can be ordered around by the president and his
appointees.
Id. (expressing criticisms of reporting system).
114. See Letter from Bowman, supranote 3, at 3 ("When downward departures
are provided, they are almost always made at the behest of prosecutors-belyingany
suggestion that departures represent some sort of systematic judicial bias against
the government or the guidelines' goals of fairer or more consistent sentencing.").
In fiscal year 2001, seventy-nine percent of downward departures were requested
by the government. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2001 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS app. B (2002) (providing data on frequency of departures
requested by government). In addition, this reporting requirement creates ajudicial "black list" which may intimidate judges and keep them from departing. See
BlacklistingJudges, supra note 72, at 10 (discussing possible effect on judges).
115. See Bowman, supra note 19, at A27 (discussing memorandum's effects);
see also Memorandum from Ashcroft, supra note 45 (detailing proper negotiations). The prosecutor cannot "fact bargain" or be a party to any agreement that
provides the sentencing court with less than a "full understanding of all readily
provable facts relevant to sentencing." Id. at 3 (limiting plea agreements). Plea
agreements must not be entered into where the government's ight to object is
waived. See id. (same). Further, prosecutors must not recommend departures unless fully consistent with all sentencing acts. See id. (same).
116. See Behre & Ifrah, supra note 16, at 8 (discussing powers of prosecutors
in sentencing).
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important leverage in plea negotiations. 11 7 Potentially, the Feeney
Amendment could considerably alter a prosecutor's ability to make plea
agreements with defendants, as departures might be granted less often,
18
thus forcing prosecutors to lose their bargaining tool.'

Finally, the legislation requires a formal motion for the defendant to
receive an additional one-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility.' 19 This reduction was previously granted without motion from the
government. 120 These changes by the Feeney Amendment certainly bol121
ster the role of the prosecutor in federal sentencing.
C.

Sentencing Commission

The Feeney Amendment is the most significant attempt to relegate
the role of the Sentencing Commission since the Commission's creation. 12 2 Despite the Commission's role as the very body charged with the
responsibility of creating and amending the Guidelines, it was virtually ig117. See id. (same).
118. See Bowman, supra note 19, at A27 (discussing potential departures as
leverage).
119. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (2003) (requiring motion from government); U.S.
Sentencing Comm'n, Sentencing Commission Sends Amendments to Congress, GUIDELINES 1 (July 2003) [hereinafter Commission Sends Amendments to Congress] (listing
PROTECT Act amendments).
120. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES § 5K2.0 (2002) (providing means to depart based on acceptance of responsibility); see also id. § 3E.1 (limiting departure
for particularly defined acceptance of responsibility).
121. Much criticism has been voiced about this increase in power. See, e.g.,
Berman, supra note 50, at 1 (quoting Judge John S. Martin). Judge Martin stated:
"I find it most disturbing how much power Congress has ceded to the Justice Department. This is a very dangerous system, when you give the U.S. Attorney that
much power and you have taken the discretion that should be in sentencing out of
the hands of [federal judges]." Id. (contending grant of power to DOJ excessive).
Similarly, Justice Kennedy stated:
Under the federal mandatory minimum statutes a sentence can be mitigated by a prosecutorial decision not to charge certain counts. There is
debate about this, but in my view a transfer of sentencing discretion from
ajudge to an Assistant U.S. Attorney, often not much older than the defendant, is misguided. The policy gives the decision to an assistant prosecutor not trained in the exercise of discretion and takes discretion from
the trialjudge. The trial judge is the one actor in the system most experienced with exercising discretion in a transparent, open, and reasoned
way. Most of the sentencing discretion should be with the judge, not the
prosecutors.
Kennedy Address, supra note 1, at 5 (opposing shift of power from judges to
prosecutors).
122. See Vinegrad, supranote 41, at 315 (addressing Feeney Amendment's disregard for Sentencing Commission). One commentator noted, "The Justice Department has embarked on a mission to eviscerate the autonomy of the Sentencing
Commission in general .... I've never seen this kind of assault on the Sentencing
Commission before." Jonathon Groner, Sentencing Commission Panel Readies for Battle,
N.Y.LJ., Aug. 20, 2003, at 1 (discussing shock of"attack" on Commission). For
a further discussion of the Commission's origin, see supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol49/iss3/7

22

2004]

Stappert: A Death Sentence for COMMENT
Justice: The Feeney Amendment Frustrates Fed

nored when Congress created the Feeney Amendment.1 23 The Commission was, however, disturbed greatly by the Amendment, with the
imposition of a new composition, new requirements and prohibitions.
The process of creating and amending the Guidelines was statutorily
granted to the Commission. 12 4 The Commission has the authority to periodically review and revise the Guidelines after consulting with various players in the criminal justice system.15 Interested organizations, such as the
Federal Public Defenders and the U.S. Probation System, communicate to
the Commission any observations, comments or questions pertinent to the
maintenance of the Guidelines and, in addition, must submit annual reports making suggestions to the Commission. 126 After voting, the Commission submits the amendments to Congress, accompanied by a
statement of the reasons for the changes.12 7 Congress blatantly disre123. See Vinegrad, supra note 41, at 314-15 (describing Congress's avoidance
of Commission).
124. See 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2003) (establishing duties of Commission). The
Commission "shallpromulgate and distributeto all courts of the United States and to
the United States Probation System-(1) guidelines, as described in this section, for
the use of a sentencing court in determining the sentence to be imposed in a
criminal case." Id. § 994(a)(1) (emphasis added) (stating authority to create
Guidelines); see also id. § 994(o) (granting Commission authority to revise
Guidelines).
125. See id. § 994(o) (providing procedure for revision of Guidelines). The
statute states:
The Commission periodically shall review and revise, in consideration of
comments and data coming to its attention, the guidelines promulgated
pursuant to the provisions of this section. In fulfilling its duties and exercising its powers, the Commission shall consult with authorities on, and
individual and institutional representatives of, various aspects of the Federal criminal justice system.
Id. (giving Commission ability to revise Guidelines).
126. See id. (noting input from various aspects of criminal justice system important to functioning of Guidelines). The statute provides:
The United States Probation System, the Bureau of Prisons, the Judicial
Conference of the United States, the Criminal Division of the United
States Department of Justice, and a representative of the Federal Public
Defenders shall submit to the Commission any observations, comments,
or questions pertinent to the work of the Commission whenever they believe such communication would be useful, and shall, at least annually,
submit to the Commission a written report commenting on the operation
of the Commission's guidelines, suggesting changes in the guidelines that
appear to be warranted, and otherwise assessing the Commission's work.
Id. (providing procedure for receiving outside input for revising Guidelines).
127. See id. § 994(a)(1) (stating vote of at least four members needed); id.
§ 994(p) (setting procedure for submission of amendments to Congress). The
Commission must submit these amendments or modifications to previously submitted amendments before the first day of May during a regular session. See id.
(indicating time frame for submission). In addition, the Commission shall specify
a date the amendment shall take effect if approved by Congress. See id. (noting
effective date should be "no earlier than 180 days after being so submitted and no
later than the first day of November of the calendar year in which the amendment
or modification is submitted").
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garded the "predictable structure and reasoned process by which the
guidelines have been evaluated, administered and reformed." 128
In addition, the composition of the Commission was altered to minimize the participation of federal judges. 129 The Feeney Amendment further prohibits the Commission from making any new downward departure
guidelines in the next two years. 130 Concurrently, it ordered the Commission to review the authorized grounds for downward departures and
amend the Guidelines and policy statements to ensure the incidence of
downward departures is substantially reduced within a 180-day time period. 13 1 The Commission was required to do this regardless of whether it
believed this measure was necessary.1 32 The Commission received input
from the bench, the bar and other organizations to assist in its deliberations through letters, reports and public hearings.' 3 3 While it could not
be predicted how the Commission would handle Congress's directive or
128. Vinegrad, supra note 41, at 315 (noting destruction of predictable process for changes of Guidelines); see also Allenbaugh, supra note 4, at 11 ("In contrast [to Congress], an expert sentencing body such as the Commission can
continuously, dispassionately and scientifically evaluate sentencing trends, and do
so transparently, not privately, with input from the public, and proceed to adjust
what naturally must be considered an evolving body of law."); Martin, supra note
12, at A31 ("Congress has tried to micromanage the work of the commission and
has undermined its efforts to provide judges with some discretion in sentencing or
to ameliorate excessively harsh terms.").
129. See 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2003) (changing composition of Commission);
Groner, supra note 122, at 1 (noting change as "aslap at the commission, which
stung many judges"). For a further discussion of the composition change and its
effects on the judiciary, see supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
130. See 28 U.S.C. § 994 (limiting Commission). The statute prohibits the
Commission from adding any new grounds for downward departures in Part K of
Chapter V until May 1, 2005. See id. (imposing suspension of promulgating new
departures); see also Commission Sends Amendments to Congress, supra note 119 (discussing same).
131. See 28 U.S.C. § 994 (instructing Commission to evaluate Guidelines).
The Act gave the Commission a deadline of October 27, 2003 for this task. See
Commission Sends Amendments to Congress,supra note 119 (same). Diana E.Murphy,
Chair of the Commission, stated, "We certainly need your help with this directive
and are publishing related issues for comment and will have a public hearing in
late summer." Id. at 2 (inviting assistance in task).
132. See Vinegrad, supra note 41, at 315 (forcing Commission to make change
regardless of necessity).
133. See Groner, supra note 122, at 1 (noting Commission received input during comment periods and public hearings). For example, on July 31, 2003, the
Federal Judges Association, an independent group that represents more than
ninety percent of federal district and appeals judges, told the Commission in a
comment that the Feeney Amendment should be repealed, stating, "Change can
be for the better. These changes were not." Id. In addition, the Practitioners'
Advisory Group, which is composed of criminal defense lawyers, suggested the
Commission should take "a modest approach" to cutting back departures. See id.
(providing input to Congress). The National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers (NACDL) also asked the Commission to "undertake a comprehensive review of not only downward departures but also of those Guidelines which are so
unjust or illsuited [sic] that they lead judges to grant downward departures."
Goldman, supra note 42, at 4 (same).
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the pressures from the various members of the criminal justice community, Congress formulated a new package of Guideline amendments now
awaiting final approval on or before May 1, 2004.134 The report encour135
ages significant limitations on departures.
VI.

THE PROTECT Acr's GOOD

INTENTIONS

Despite the contention produced by the Feeney Amendment, the
PROTECT Act was enacted with some good intentions. The legislation
3 6
dedicates with full force resources to protect our nation's children.1
Law enforcement's ability to prevent, investigate and punish violent
13 7
crimes against children has been comprehensively strengthened.
The PROTECT Act establishes the America's Missing Broadcast Emergency Response Alert bill ("AMBER Alert") to help locate and recover
134. See generally Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, USSC Acts to Reduce DownBRANCH (Issue 10, Oct. 2003), available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/ttb/oct03ttb/ussc/index.html [hereinafter Downward Departures] (summarizing Commission's report). The president of the NACDL commented that "[t]he Sentencing Commission is composed of decent and
conscientious members who.., are attempting to achieve a rational, workable and
fair sentencing structure. They have however, the swords of Congress at their
necks." Goldman, supra note 42, at 4. One commentator posed an important
question: "Will the Sentencing Commission withstand the Congressional pressure
to radically reduce the incidence of downward departures and instead promulgate
reasoned reforms that preserve judicial discretion?" Vinegrad, supra note 41, at
316 (questioning Commission's pending decision).
The report submitted by the Commission to Congress is over 177 pages in
length and provides substantial discussions on its decisions and includes several
charts and graphs. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: DowNWARD DEPARTURES FROM THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES (Oct. 2003), available
at http://www.ussc.gov/departrpt03/departrpt03.pdf (answering Feeney Amendment's directive).
135. See generally Downward Departures,supra note 134 (summarizing Commission's report). The new package of amendments:
[P]rohibited departures based solely on the existence of plea agreement;
prohibited a number of existing grounds for downward departures: acceptance of responsibility, minor role in the offense, gambling addiction,
and legally-required restitution... ; limited the availability of a departure
based on family ties and responsibilities[,] aberrant behavior[,] and similar circumstances; significantly limited both the availability and the extent
of departures permissible for certain offenders with substantial criminal
history; implemented a directive authorizing limited departures pursuant
to early disposition (fast track) programs authorized by the Attorney General and the U.S. Attorney; emphasized throughout the guideline amendment the requirement for courts to state with specificity their reasons for
departures in order to comply with the PROTECT Act and to facilitate
the USSC's ongoing monitoring of departure practice as well as appellate
review.
Id.
136. See DOJ, Fact Sheet: PROTECT Act (Apr. 30, 2003), at http://
www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/April/03-ag-266.htm [hereinafter DOJ Fact Sheet]
(providing list of problems and solutions addressed by PROTECT Act).
137. See id. (supporting effect of PROTECT Act on law enforcement's ability
to combat violence towards children).
ward Departures, 35 THIRD
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missing and abducted children.1 38 This bill supports national coordination of state and local AMBER Alert programs. 139 Most importantly, the
AMBER Alert system "galvanizes entire communities to assist law enforce1 40
ment in the time-sensitive search for and safe return of child victims."
National and state broadcast systems report abductions instantly upon receiving notification. 1 4 1 Information including any descriptions of the abductor and victim, vehicle model and license plate number, and any other
indicators are broadcasted. 142 A national coordinator was appointed and
substantial funds were provided to monitor and support AMBER Alert systems.' 4 3 The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children reported that, as ofJanuary 27, 2004, over 122 children were recovered since
144
AMBER Alert's implementation.

Additionally, the Act provides new investigative tools to assist in detecting and stopping child pornography. Law enforcement is now permitted to use wiretaps, an important tool used in crimes involving the
Internet to lure children for sexual abuse and trafficking. 145 The Act en138. See id. (discussing solution to law enforcement having inadequate tools
to help locate missing children). The AMBER Alert bill honors Amber Hagerman,
who was kidnapped and murdered in Arlington, Texas, in 1996 at age nine. See
Vinegrad, supra note 41, at 310 (describing that AMBER Alert was "widely supported and provoked little controversy").
139. See DOJ Fact Sheet, supra note 136 (noting coordination of different
jurisdictions).
140. Id. Over eighty-nine plans exist nationwide. See id. (suggesting coordinator working to develop "seamless nationwide child protection system in EVERY
state").
141. See Code Amber Found., The Web's Amber Alert System, at http://
codeamber.org/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2004) (providing information on AMBER
Alert). While each individual state program establishes its own criteria, the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children suggests three criteria that
should be met before an alert is activated. See id. (detailing elements of effective
system). First, a child abduction is confirmed by law enforcement. See id. (listing
first criterion). Next, law enforcement must believe that the child is in danger of
serious bodily harm or death because of circumstances surrounding the abduction.
See id. (listing second criterion). Third, enough information concerning the abduction must exist to believe an immediate broadcast would help. See id. (listing
third criterion). Typically, if the three criteria are met, alert information is put
together for public distribution over radio, television and the Internet. See id.
(demonstrating actions taken if criteria are met).
142. See id. (suggesting any information is helpful).
143. See DOJ Fact Sheet, supra note 136 (establishing guidance and funds for
program). On October 2, 2002, Attorney General John Ashcroft designated
Deborah Daniels, Assistant Attorney General for the Office ofJustice Programs, to
serve as coordinator. See id. (appointing coordinator of AMBER Alert). A total of
twenty-five million dollars was provided in fiscal year 2004 for the states to build
and support the AMBER Alert system. See id. (affording monetary support).
144. See National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, AMBER Plan, at
http://www.missingkids.com/missingkids/servlet/PageServlet?LanguageCountry
=ENUS&Pageld=991 (last visited Jan. 27, 2004) (updating daily lives saved as result of PROTECT Act).
145. See id. (providing example of existing legal tools now used to combat full
range of crimes against children). Under prior law, wiretaps were not allowed for
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courages Internet service providers to voluntarily report child pornography found on their systems. 14 6 Further, the PROTECT Act revises and
strengthens the prohibition on virtual child pornography, barring any ob14 7
scene materials depicting children.
Further, prosecutions for crimes against children can no longer be
barred by the statute of limitations because the PROTECT Act eliminated
the statute of limitations for abductions and physical or sexual abuse of
children. 148 Under previous law, the statute of limitations expired when
the victim turned twenty-five years old. 14 9 This limit potentially allowed
offenders to go free if law enforcement could not solve the crime in
time. 150 Similarly, under prior law, post-release supervision of sex offenders was capped at five years.' 5 ' Now, any term of supervised release can be
imposed, including a term of life supervision, which is more appropriate
152
considering the high rate of recidivism for this type of crime.
The benefits of the PROTECT Act could have been achieved without
so severely limiting judges' discretion and without such a disruption of the
sentencing scheme. The PROTECT Act provides enhanced penalties for
alleged offenders. The legislation makes it more difficult for a person accused of a crime against children to attain bail.1 5 3 Increased sentences for
various crimes associated with luring children over the Internet. See id. (describing
change in law).
146. See id. (encouraging greater reporting of child pornography).
147. See id. (discussing child pornography over Internet). The Supreme
Court held in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition that a federal law that criminalized the
possession of "virtual" child pornography was unconstitutional. See 535 U.S. 234,
273 (2002) (discussing holding). Virtual child pornography includes materials
that depict minors engaging in sexual activity, but uses computer-generated
images instead of real children. See id. at 241-42 (describing Court's reasoning that

virtual pornography does not directly hurt children because children are not used
in its creation). This decision made it difficult for prosecutors to prove that child
pornography involved the use of real children, and therefore, defendants often
successfully avoided conviction by claiming there was reasonable doubt that the
computer image involved a real child. See id. at 254-55 (recognizing burden on
prosecution); see also DOJFactSheet, supra note 136 (addressing difficulty of distinguishing virtual pornography from pornography involving actual children).
148. See PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650, 660 (2003) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3283 (2003)) (eliminating statute of limitations).
The statute provides that "[n]o statute of limitations that would otherwise preclude prosecution for an offense involving the sexual or physical abuse, or kidnapping, of a child under the age of 18 years shall preclude such prosecution during
the life of the child." Id.
149. See DOJ Fact Sheet, supra note 136 (noting former statute of limitations).
150. See id. (discussing prior implications of statute of limitations).
151. See id. (noting cap on post-release supervision).

152. See PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21. 117 Stat. 650, 651 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3583) (eliminating cap on term imposed); see also DOJFact
Sheet, supra note 136 (recognizing child sex offenders usually repeat crime).
153. See PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21. 117 Stat. 650, 660 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3142) (making attainment of bail more difficult).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2004

27

Villanova Law
Review, Vol. LAW
49, Iss. 3REVIEW
[2004], Art. 7
VILLANOVA

[Vol. 49: p. 693

child abductors and child pornographers were also implemented.154 Despite being perceived as benefits by some, these changes made by the
PROTECT Act discordantly curtail the judiciary's authority to reduce
sentences and, therefore, force ajudge to treat each offender similarly.1 55
VII.

CONCLUSION

Since its original proposal, the Feeney Amendment has been under
constant criticism. 156 The disapproval is mostly due to Congress's passage
of the Amendment without the benefit of full and balanced information
157
on the use and misuse of downward departures in federal sentencing.
The statistics utilized by Congress misrepresented downward departures as
overused, indicating a judiciary content in handing out lenient
sentences. 158 This legislation passed dubiously without any input or influence by the federal judiciary, the Sentencing Commission or other members of the criminal justice system.1 59 While the federal sentencing
scheme is not without flaws and the Guidelines are not perfect in their
application, the drastic measures taken by the Feeney Amendment are
alarming. Accordingly, the opposition comes strong and committed to
remedying the effects of this controversial legislation.
A.

The JUDGESAct: Possibility of Parolefrom the Feeney Amendment

On May 20, 2003, the Judicial Use of Discretion to Guarantee Equity
in Sentencing Act of 2003 ("JUDGES Act") 160 was introduced in Congress. 16 1 This bill, supported by several senators, is an effort to repeal the
provisions of the PROTECT Act, namely the Feeney Amendment, that do
154. See PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21. 117 Stat. 650, 652-56 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 111, 2251, 2251A, 2252, 2252A, 2422-23, 1591; 28 U.S.C.
§§ 994, 2423, 3559 (2003)) (increasing sentences); see also DOJFactSheet, supranote
136 (detailing enhanced penalties).
155. See 18 U.S.C. § 3552 (2003) (removing judges' ability to depart downward in cases involving children); 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2003) (same).
156. See Statements of Senators Edward M. Kennedy and Patrick Leahy Supporting the JUDGES Act, supra note 16, at 372 ("The Judicial Conference of the
United States, the American Bar Association, the U.S. Sentencing Commission,
and many prosecutors, defense attorneys, law professors, civil rights organizations,
and business groups vigorously oppose [the Feeney Amendment]."). For further
discussion on criticism of the Feeney Amendment, see supra notes 1-5, 43-44 and
accompanying text.
157. For further discussion on the Feeney Amendment's adoption, see supra
notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
158. For further discussion of statistics considered, see supra note 63.
159. For further discussion on the lack of stakeholder input, see supra notes
43-44 and accompanying text.
160. H.R. 2213, 108th Cong. (2003).
161. See Vinegrad, supra note 41, at 316 (indicating Senator Edward M. Kennedy and Representative John Conyers, Jr. introduced bill).
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not specifically deal with the exploitation of children. 162 One senator
commented that the Feeney Amendment has "nothing to do with protecting children, and everything to do with handcuffing judges and eliminat63
ing fairness in our federal sentencing system."'
If passed, the JUDGES Act would effectively repeal the provisions of
the Feeney Amendment. 164 Conceding that the Guidelines and sentencing structure may need reform, the JUDGES Act requires the Commission
to report on the incidence of downward departures. 16 5 The JUDGES Act
requires the Commission to submit the report to Congress within 180 days
of its passage. 166 The report shall include: a history of departures in the
federal sentencing system, an extensive study of variations of departure
rates per districts and circuits, a comparison between federal and state
departure authority, an analysis of district judges' grounds for departures,
a review of departure appeals and assessments extensively covering departures and their promotion of the federal sentencing scheme.1 6 7 The Commission is also required to hold at least one public hearing to solicit views
1 68
of interested parties on the topic.
Such a report, had it been done and relied upon, would have been
useful to Congress when considering the Feeney Amendment and may
have justified its adoption. 169 The goal is that if the JUDGES Act goes into
effect, the report will provide Congress with a solid basis for further action. 170 If the report suggests that judges are abusing their discretion and
granting too many departures, then and only then will Congress be justified

162. See Statements of Senators Edward M. Kennedy and Patrick Leahy Supporting the JUDGES Act, supranote 16, at 372 (providing motivation for bill proposal). Additionally, in September 2003, the Judicial Conference voted to support
repealing the controversial amendments to the PROTECT Act. See Admin. Office
of the U.S. Courts, JudicialConference Seeks Restoration ofJudges' Sentencing Authority,
35 THIRD BRANCH (Issue 10, Oct. 2003), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/
oct03ttb/restoration/index.html (setting forth support provisions needing
repeal).
163. Statements of Senators Edward M. Kennedy and Patrick Leahy Supporting the JUDGES Act, supra note 16, at 372.
164. See H.R. 2213, 108th Cong. § 3 (2003) (repealing Feeney Amendment of
PROTECT Act).
165. See id. § 2 (requiring report issued by Commission to Congress).
166. See id. § 2(a) (setting deadline for report).
167. See id. § 2(b) (1)-(10) (providing specific content desired in report).
168. See id. § 2(c) (requiring public hearing to solicit views). Recommended
views to solicit include those of the federal judiciary, DOJ and the defense bar. See
id. § 2(c)(2) (naming parties from whom Commission should solicit input).
169. For further discussion of considerations in passing the Sentencing Reform Act, see supra note 16.
170. See Statements of Senators Edward M. Kennedy and Patrick Leahy Supporting the JUDGES Act, supra note 16, at 373 (noting report will justify subsequent action by Congress).
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in limiting that discretion. 17 1 If it is revealed that judges should be given
172
more discretion, then Congress should so provide.
B.

Impact

Precisely how each actor in the system will respond to the Feeney
Amendment or operate under its confines is unpredictable. 17 3 One unfortunate result has already transpired: good judges are tossing in their
gavels and leaving the bench out of frustration. 174 The HonorableJohn S.
Martin, Jr., a federal district judge, announced his resignation only two
months after the Feeney Amendment's enactment. 17 5 The judge
remarked:
For a judge to be deprived of the ability to consider all of the
factors that go into formulating a just sentence is completely at
odds with the sentencing philosophy that has been a hallmark of
the American system of justice .... I no longer want to be part

176
of our unjust criminal justice system.

Hopefully, this retreat from the bench will be isolated and limited. 177 The
message, however, along with those of many other judges voicing their
concerns and refusing to be intimidated by the Act, must be clearly
178
heard.
171. See id. (showing objective report might direct decreased judicial
discretion).
172. See id. (same).
173. See Vinegrad, supra note 41, at 316 (presuming reactions will result and
questioning response by each actor).
174. See Martin, supra note 12, at A31 (illustratingjudge leaving in response to
legislation).
175. See Controversial Memo, supra note 31 (explaining PROTECT Act caused
judge to leave bench).
176. Id. Judge Martin pointed out every sentence of imprisonment imposed
not only affects the defendant but also the lives of innocent family members. See
id. (acknowledging other sentencing considerations).
177. See id. (hoping response to legislation would not involve judges leaving
bench). The Honorable Myron H. Bright of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, in his concurring opinion in United States v. Flores, urged district
judges to use their opinions to disclose their views about the "injustice in the sentencing decision or decisions [they] are obligated to impose by Congressional
mandate and/or the Sentencing Guidelines." 336 F.3d 760, 767 (8th Cir. 2003)
(Bright, J., concurring). ChiefJudge Marilyn Hall Patel of the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of California commented that "the wisdom of the years
and breadth of the experience accumulated by judges and the Sentencing Commission in adjudicating criminal cases and sentencing defendants is chucked for
the inexperience of young prosecutors and the equally young think-tank policy
makers in the legislative and executive branches." Controversial Memo, supra note
31 (criticizing PROTECT Act).
178. See Talk Left, New York's FederalJudges Protest Sentencing Law Changes, at
http://talkleft.com/new-archives/004577.html#004577 (last visited Apr. 19, 2004)
(acknowledging efforts of U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second CircuitJudge John
M. WalkerJr. and twenty-six other judges around country issuing statement calling
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Additionally, one can only hope that the steady erosion of judges'
179
While
discretion in federal sentencing will come to a swift conclusion.
as
only time will reveal its long-term effect, the Feeney Amendment stands180
a significant and unwelcome development in federal sentencing law.
18
Unfortunately, sometimes "U]ustice is incidental to law and order." '
Patrice Stappert

for repeal of Feeney Amendment and encouraging "judges from around the country [to] follow the example of these outspoken New York jurists and just say no' to
Feeney").
179. See Vinegrad, supra note 41, at 316 (offering desire that judges regain
discretion).
180. See id. (contending legislation disfavored).
181. LAwYER: JOKES, QuoTEs, AND ANECDOTES 264 (Patrick Regan ed., 2001)
(quoting former FBI DirectorJ. Edgar Hoover).
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